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Nicole L. Waters and Valerie P. Hans*
Approximately 6 percent of criminal juries hang. But, how many dissenters
carry the jury, hang the jury, or conform to the majority’s wishes? This
article examines the formation of individual verdict preferences, the impact
of deliberation, and the role of the dissenter using data from nearly 3,500
jurors who decided felony cases. Jurors were asked: “If it were entirely up to
you as a one-person jury, what would your verdict have been in this case?”
Over one-third of jurors, privately, would have voted against their jury’s
decision. Analyses identify the characteristics of jurors who dissent, and
distinguish dissenters who hang the jury from dissenters who acquiesce.
Deliberation procedures, juror role expectations, their evidentiary views,
and their sense of fairness affected the likelihood of dissent. Contrary to
previous research, deliberations play a vital role in generating juror consensus and shed new light on the debate over the requirement that juries be
unanimous in their verdict.

I. Introduction
How do jurors form opinions about the evidence in a case? When do they
make up their minds? What goes on behind the closed doors of jury deliberation? Questions about the formation of jurors’ individual and collective
decisions have always stimulated a great deal of interest and discussion. They
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are also the stuff of solemn pronouncements: “Jurors form their opinions
early on.” “Deliberations are unimportant.” “Dissenters conform to the
majority so they can get home for dinner.” Some of these claims depend on
the keen insights of lawyers and other court observers, honed through years
of experience with jury trials. For example, the late and highly acclaimed
litigator Alfred Julien insisted that the opening statement is perhaps the
most significant phase of the trial, since “[j]urymen have been prone to say
that once the opening statements were made there was nothing left to the
case.”1 Jury consultants Don Vinson and David Davis drew on their consulting experience to conclude that “the vast majority of jurors arrive at a verdict
predisposition during or immediately after opening statements. Further,
these initial decisions are remarkably consistent with the final verdicts that
jurors render at the conclusion of the trial.”2
This article aims to shed an empirical light on the process of opinion
formation and change in juries using questionnaire data and case information collected as part of a National Center for State Courts (NCSC) project
on hung juries.3 This article employs jurors’ responses from the NCSC study
surveying approximately 3,500 jurors in four large urban courts. The NCSC
project asked jurors, once their trial was concluded, to report on their
individual opinions, verdict preferences, and the dynamics of deliberations.
Earlier analyses of these data identified the prime factors that led to
jurors’ first votes in these criminal trials.4 One of the central findings was that
juror votes and jury verdicts are strongly related to the strength of the
evidence presented at the trial, whether the evidence is rated by the jurors or
the judge.5 The stronger the evidence against the criminal defendant, the

1

Alfred S. Julien, Opening Statements § 1.01, at 2 (Supp. 1996).

2

Donald E. Vinson & David S. Davis, Jury Persuasion: Psychological Strategies & Trial Techniques 199 (3d ed. 1996).

3

Paula Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, Are Hung
Juries a Problem? (2002), a report published by the National Center for State Courts. Available
at 〈http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesPub.pdf〉.

4

Id. For the first vote analysis, see Stephen P. Garvey, Paula Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans,
Nicole L. Mott, G. Thomas Munsterman & Martin T. Wells, Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials,
2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 371 (2004).

5

Id.; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Waters,
G. Thomas Munsterman, Stewart J. Schwab & Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury Agreement in Crimi-
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more likely jurors are to vote guilty on the first ballot. The juror’s view of the
fairness of the law, the perceived harshness of the consequences of a conviction in the case, and a perceived lack of credibility in police testimony are
all related to his or her willingness to vote not guilty.6 The importance of a
juror’s race varies with the location of trial and the type of charges filed
against the defendant.7
This article builds on these earlier analyses to examine the development of opinion formation during trial, examining when jurors begin to
lean toward one side, how often and at what trial stages they change their
minds, the impact of jury deliberation on juror verdict preferences, and the
distinctive situation of dissenters from the majority.
The role of jury deliberation in opinion change is of special interest. Is
deliberation pointless, as some have claimed, or is there evidence that substantial movement occurs during jury deliberation? The collected work on
jury decision making confirms that the first ballot vote is strongly related to
the jury’s final verdict.8 Kalven and Zeisel’s classic book, The American Jury,
concluded that the strong relationship between the majority’s verdict preferences at the start of the deliberation and the jury’s final verdict meant that
deliberation was not a significant element: “[I]t brings out the picture, but
the outcome is pre-determined.”9
However, other research identifies important benefits of jury deliberation. In fact, some scholars point to the jury deliberation as the key element of
the jury system that promotes its soundness as a factfinder.10 The opportunity

nal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 171 (2005).
6

Fairness of the law is examined in Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at
Work: A Glimpse from the National Center for State Courts’ Study of Hung Juries, 78 Chi-K. L.
Rev. 1249 (2003).

7

See Garvey et al., supra note 4, at 380–95.

8

Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating
Groups, 7 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 622 (2001).

9

Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 489 (1966).

10

Dennis Devine et al., Deliberation Quality: A Preliminary Examination in Criminal Juries, 4 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. 273 (2007); Phoebe Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One? 52
Law & Contemp. Probs. 205 (1989); Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod & Nancy Pennington, Inside
the Jury (1983).
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to combine knowledge, compare and debate different understandings of the
evidence, and correct one another’s errors all enhance the jury’s ability to
reach a decision consistent with the evidence. Finally, in a minority of trials,
the jury ultimately acquits despite the fact that the initial majority favored
conviction.11 Indeed, mock jury research suggests that there is an asymmetrical bias, whereby minorities arguing for acquittal have an easier time convincing their colleagues to find the defendant not guilty compared to convictionprone minorities who attempt to persuade their acquittal-prone fellow jurors
to find the defendant guilty.12 However, one recent study with actual juries did
not find the expected asymmetrical relationship.13
The position of the dissenter, glorified in the 1957 jury movie Twelve
Angry Men as played by Henry Fonda, is arguably one of the most intriguing
aspects of jury deliberation.14 But, how many dissenters carry the jury, how
many hang the jury, and how many simply conform to the majority’s wishes?
The NCSC study estimated that approximately 6 percent of criminal juries in
state courts and between 2 percent and 3 percent of criminal juries in federal
courts nationwide are unable to reach a final verdict.15 Because the NCSC
study asked a variety of questions about individual jurors’ opinions, and
recorded the jury’s verdict in each case, it is possible to identify dissenters
and, furthermore, to differentiate between dissenters who hold out or who
conform. The study permits us to distinguish between the juror who dissents
from the majority to hang the jury, and the dissenter who acquiesces, conforming to the majority and allowing a group decision against the dissenter’s
individual wishes. This article analyzes what personal and case factors lead a
dissenter to conform or to hold out against the majority.
11

Valerie P. Hans, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, The
Hung Jury: The American Jury’s Insights and Contemporary Understanding, 39 Crim. L. Bull.
33 (2003).
12

Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation:
Jurors’ Bias for Leniency, 54 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 21 (1988).
13
Dennis J. Devine et al., Explaining Jury Verdicts: Is Leniency Bias for Real? 34 J. Applied Soc.
Psychol. 2064 (2004).
14

A special symposium issue of the Chicago-Kent Law Review was devoted to scholarly consideration of the 1957 movie upon its 50th anniversary; see Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to the
50th Anniversary of 12 Angry Men, 82 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 557 (2007).
15

Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans & G. Thomas Munsterman, How Much Justice
Hangs in the Balance? A New Look at Hung Jury Rates, 83 Judicature 59 (1999).
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Inspired by social decision scheme and social transition scheme theories, researchers have employed group decision-making experiments, mock
jury studies, and computer simulations to explore opinion shifts during
collective discussions.16 Some mock jury research suggests that jurors revise
and update their preferences throughout the trial and deliberations.17
However, the process of opinion formation and change with real jurors over
the duration of their trials has not been extensively studied. Hannaford and
her colleagues examined opinion formation in Arizona civil juries.18 That
project, using questionnaires from 1,385 jurors in 172 civil trials, examined
jurors’ self-reports about when they began leaning toward one side and when
they made up their minds about who should prevail in the civil trial. As in
other social-psychological research on two-sided communication, the civil
jurors appeared to wait until they heard arguments from both sides before
making up their minds. The evidentiary portions of the trial—plaintiff evidence and defense evidence—and jury deliberation were the most common
trial segments during which jurors reported they began leaning toward one
side, and at a similar rate (between 19–24 percent for each). The jury
deliberation was far and away the most significant trial segment in which
jurors reportedly made up their minds; 46 percent of the civil jurors identified it.
In Hannaford and colleagues’ civil jury project, jurors in complex cases
were more likely to delay making up their minds until later in the trial. In
addition, jurors in weaker cases took longer to lean toward and decide for a
party. The only demographic characteristic to affect opinion formation in
civil juries was the juror’s educational level. More highly educated jurors
began leaning toward a verdict preference earlier than less educated jurors.
However, more educated jurors also changed their minds more often, and
reportedly came to a decision at later stages in the trial compared to less
educated jurors.
Whether and how these case and individual factors also influence real
criminal jury opinion development has not yet been studied and is worth
16

Devine et al., supra note 8, at 625, 690–92.

17

Id.; H.P. Weld & E.R. Danzig, A Study of the Way in Which a Verdict is Reached by a Jury, 1940
Am. J. Psychol. 518 (1940).
18
Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Timing
of Opinion Formation by Jurors in Civil Cases: An Empirical Examination, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 627
(2000).
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exploring. The burden of proof, the evidence, the legal issues, and typical
jury size all differ in civil and criminal trials; whether the jury must come to
a unanimous decision or may decide by majority vote may differ as well.
Thus, the current study evaluates the formation of individual verdict preferences, the impact of deliberation, and the role of the dissenter, employing
the NCSC’s comprehensive research project on felony juries.

II. Methodology
Four sites participated in the NCSC project, originally designed to examine
differences between criminal juries that reached a verdict or were hung
juries: Los Angeles County Superior Court (CA); Maricopa County Superior
Court (Phoenix, AZ); the Bronx County Supreme Court (NY); and the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The timing of data collection
spanned 2000–2001 and varied for each site. Court staff distributed packets
of surveys in court and returned the completed surveys to NCSC staff in
noncapital felony jury cases across the four sites. Each packet contained four
sets of instructions and questionnaires (a case data form, a questionnaire for
the judge, both attorneys, and all the jurors). Trial participants returned
completed questionnaires in sealed envelopes to protect their confidentiality. Response rates were excellent—92 percent of the jurors responded, 89
percent of the case data forms were returned, 91 percent of the judges
responded, and 88 percent of the time at least one attorney per case
responded. In all, 3,497 jurors completed questionnaires in 382 cases. There
were sufficient data on 367 trials (86 in Los Angeles County; 96 in Maricopa
County; 91 in Bronx County; and 94 in the District of Columbia) for their
inclusion in this project. Thus, data analyses reported in this article are based
on 367 trials. A more detailed description of the methodology may be found
in the full report.19
The analyses in this article rely predominantly on the posttrial juror
questionnaire, which included questions about jurors’ perceptions of attorney skill, evidence, the dynamics of deliberations, juror influence, conflict,
reaction to the group’s verdict, opinion about applicable law, assessment of
criminal justice in community, and demographic information. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the questionnaire items employed in the article’s

19

Hannaford-Agor et al., supra note 3.
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Summary Statistics for Jurors

Question Asked of Jurors (scale)
Deliberations/Voting Behavior
When did you start leaning towards one side?
(1 = during prosecutor’s opening statement, 8 = during deliberations)
When was jury’s first vote?
(1 = right at the beginning of deliberations, 6 = only at the end of
deliberations)
How certain were you on the first vote?
(1 = not at all certain, 7 = very certain)
Were you given enough time to express your views?
(1 = definitely no, 7 = definitely yes)
How influential were you in the deliberations?
(1 = not at all influential, 7 = very influential)
Difficult to judge another person due to religious beliefs?
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)
Evidence
How easy/difficult for jury to understand evidence?
(1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy)
How close was the case?
(1 = evidence strongly favored one side, 4 = evidence did not favor
either side)
How easy/difficult to understand the expert testimony?
(1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy)
How believable was police testimony?
(1 not at all believable, 7 = very believable)
Attitudes
How worried about consequences of conviction to defendant were you?
(1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal)
How fair was the legally correct outcome?
(1 = very unfair, 7 = very fair)
How fair was the law in this case?
(1 = not at all fair, 7 = very fair)
How much do you trust police in your community?
(1 = none, 7 = great deal)

Mean

SD

4.5

2.2

3.0

1.5

5.7

1.7

6.4

1.2

4.6

1.5

2.1

1.8

4.9

1.7

2.7

1.1

5.4

1.6

5.1

1.7

3.4

2.1

5.4

1.6

5.7

1.5

5.1

1.5

data analyses; Table 2 (Column 1) displays the juror sample’s overall demographic makeup.
Most relevant to this article were questions about the jurors’ opinion
formation, their initial and final verdict preferences, and their voting
behavior. Jurors were asked: “Thinking back over the trial and jury deliberations, when would you say that you started learning toward one side or
the other in this case?” They also were asked: “Did you find yourself changing your mind about the direction you were leaning during any of the
following stages of the trial?” Provided a list of trial stages, jurors checked
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all the stages that applied. They answered the question: “Before you began
deliberating with your fellow jurors at the end of the trial (after all of the
evidence and the judge’s instructions had been presented), which side did
you favor?”20 Jurors were asked to recall their own first ballot vote on the
most serious charge, their own final vote on that charge, and the vote split
on the group’s first and final votes for the most serious charge (e.g., 8 vs.
4 for conviction).
Jurors were also asked: “If it were entirely up to you as a one-person
jury, what would your verdict have been in this case?” We identify their
response to this item as their “one-person jury verdict.” The question invited
jurors to report their own private verdict preference as distinct from either
their own votes or the jury’s verdict at the end of deliberation. One potential
interpretation issue, which we return to in the discussion section of this
article, is that jurors may have interpreted the one-person jury question as
their verdict preference prior to the deliberations, without the influence of
other jurors or, alternatively, without the need to follow the judge’s instructions on the law. Nonetheless, it provides a unique window into juror preferences and is employed in several key analyses.
The jury questionnaire responses were supplemented by selected data
from other questionnaires, particularly the case data form, which provided
the type of charge and the final jury decision, and the judicial questionnaire,
which provided judges’ ratings of evidence strength and complexity.
To obtain summary measures for juries on particular variables, individual jurors’ responses from the same case were combined. To arrive at vote
counts, each case was evaluated individually. The coding of the final vote was
based on the context of all responses within a jury, since at times, jurors
within a jury disagreed about the exact numbers supporting each verdict.
Because some trials involved multiple counts, we also developed a measure
that allowed us to compare trials with single and multiple charges. The
variable, general verdict measure, takes into account multiple charges and
summarizes the predominant outcome of the jury trial. For example, in a
multiple count case, if the clear majority of the counts resulted in convictions, the general verdict measure would be recorded as “guilty.”

20
The NCSC hung jury project’s advisory committee expressed concern about requesting information that could lead to challenge of jury verdicts, and strongly recommended that the
questionnaire include no specific question about when criminal trial jurors made up their
minds. See Valerie P. Hans, Jury Research Ethics and the Integrity of Jury Deliberations, in Jury
Ethics: Juror Conduct and Jury Dynamics 247 (J. Kleinig & James P. Levine eds., 2006).
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III. Results
A. The Timing of Opinion Formation in Felony Trials
The first analysis examines juror reports of when during the trial they began
to lean toward one side and change their mind. Figure 1 displays the selfreported timing of juror opinion development, showing the overlap yet
slight variation among trials that resulted in convictions, acquittals, or hung
juries. Reportedly, only a small number of jurors (9 percent) began to lean
toward one side or another during the opening statements. Most jurors (53
percent) reported that they began forming an opinion during the evidentiary period, particularly during the prosecution’s case. Another 20 percent
said they only began leaning toward one side once they deliberated with
other jurors.
Comparing cases in which the majority of the jury convicted, acquitted,
or hung on any charge, jurors’ reports of when they began leaning toward
one side revealed some differences. When a majority of jurors voted to acquit
the defendant, relatively few jurors (15 percent) reported themselves to be
undecided at the time of deliberation. On the other hand, 21 percent of
jurors on juries with a majority to convict and 24 percent of jurors on juries
that hung on a charge said they waited until final deliberations to lean
toward one side in the case.
On the questionnaire, jurors indicated whether they changed their
minds about their preliminary verdict preferences during the case and, if

Figure 1: When did you start leaning towards a side?
Prosecution's opening
Defense's opening
Prosecution's evidence
Defense's evidence
Prosecution's closing
Defense's closing
Judge's instructions
Jury deliberation
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so, when this change occurred. Remarkably, most jurors (62 percent)
changed their mind at least once. The two time periods with the largest
percentage of jurors changing their minds occurred during understandable stages. Almost one-fifth (18 percent) of the jurors reported they
changed their minds during the state’s testimony, and almost one-quarter
(24 percent) of the jurors changed their minds during deliberations with
other jurors.
Despite the reports of substantial individual juror opinion change, in
most cases, the jury’s first vote strongly resembled the jury’s final vote. As
previously reported, 89 percent of the juries in which a substantial majority
(e.g., at least 8 of 12) favored conviction on the first vote ultimately convicted the defendant on the final vote.21 Likewise, 87 percent of juries in
which a substantial majority favored acquittal found the defendant not
guilty on the final vote. On the other hand, 80 percent of juries with first
ballot votes that were closely split (e.g., 6–6 or 5–7) shifted toward either an
acquittal or conviction by the final vote in deliberations. If jurors were
closely split or the jury votes revealed only a slight majority, the case was
more likely to hang than for juries with a substantial majority on the first
vote. The first jury vote to final jury verdict analysis does not show an
asymmetrical preference toward acquittal that is said to characterize jury
verdicts.22
B. Analysis of the Dissenters
Jurors holding dissenting minority opinions are of great interest in any
examination of the deliberation process. They have a range of options: they
could embark on an uphill battle to convince the majority faction to adopt
their viewpoints; they could acquiesce to the majority faction; or they could
hold out and hang the jury. If an individual juror would have found the
defendant not guilty, but the jury voted to convict (or vice versa), the juror
is identified, for the purposes of this analysis, as a dissenter.
Because the questionnaire included multiple measures of juror and
jury verdict preferences, there were multiple ways of characterizing the
frequency of dissenting jurors. Recall that jurors provided their initial

21

Hannaford et al., supra note 3; Hans et al., The Hung Jury, supra note 11.

22

MacCoun & Kerr, supra note 12.
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individual verdict preferences and their final verdict preferences, as well as
their one-person jury verdicts, which was the verdict they would have reached
had they been deciding the case alone. Recall also that information from the
case data form allowed us to determine the jury’s final verdict, the jury’s final
verdict on the first count (usually the most serious charge), and the general
verdict measure, the predominant verdict outcome reached by the jury in
both single- and multiple-count cases.
Comparing the one-person jury verdicts to the general verdict measure
to obtain a count of dissenters is a conservative approach to estimating their
frequency. It should identify the fewest dissenters because it combines all
counts, including secondary and lesser-included offenses, to arrive at a
general finding of conviction, acquittal, or hung. Nonetheless, even using
this conservative approach, a significant proportion of juries (38 percent)
include dissenters, that is, jurors whose one-person jury verdict was at odds
with the general verdict reached by the jury as a whole. This conservative
measure of jury dissent is employed in subsequent analyses.
Two other ways of measuring individual dissent are worth noting,
however. Over half the juries (54 percent) included at least one juror whose
one-person jury verdict diverged from the final vote of the jury. In addition,
we compared the one-person jury verdicts to the jury’s verdict on the first
count. Although the first count is generally the most serious charge facing
the defendant and many previous vote questions referred to the most serious
charge, the one-person jury question did not specify “on the most serious
charge.” Still, 46 percent of the juries included at least one juror whose
one-person jury verdict differed from the jury’s decision on the first count.
Thus, depending on what approach is taken to measuring the jury’s verdict,
from 38 percent to 54 percent of juries included at least one juror who
reported an individual verdict preference contrary to the jury’s verdict. The
substantial percentage of juries with one-person jury dissenters under any of
these measures raises questions about the meaning and significance of ostensible unanimity, an issue to which we return in the discussion section of the
article.
When there was a disparity between jurors’ one-person verdict and the
jury’s verdict, most often the minority faction consisted of one or two jurors.
Figure 2 illustrates that when the jury acquitted or convicted, typically the
most common dissenting faction size was one. However, when the case
resulted in a hung jury, the minority faction was often larger. Half the time
the jury hung with three or more dissenters, indicating that a larger minority
was less likely to acquiesce to the majority.
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Percent of Juries

Figure 2: Size of dissenting faction and jurors’ one-person verdict.
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C. Differences Between the Majority and the Dissenters
1. Differences in Verdict Preferences, Timing, and Certainty
The remaining data analyses take up the phenomenon of these surprisingly
numerous dissenting jurors. To allow comparisons across these analyses, we
use the responses to the one-person jury verdict question (“If it were
entirely up to you as a one-person jury, what would your verdict have been
in this case?”) as the measure of an individual juror’s verdict, and we
employ the general verdict measure (the predominant outcome in both
single- and multiple-count cases) as the measure of the jury’s verdict. Analyses compare three groups: the majority jurors, whose one-person jury
verdict was the same as the jury’s verdict as measured by the general verdict
measure (majority), the dissenting jurors whose one-person jury verdict
differed from the group’s general verdict measure, but who eventually
acquiesced to the majority (conforming dissenters), and the dissenting
jurors who hung the jury (holdouts).
The following sections explore variables that differentiate between the
juror groups. This section explores verdict preferences, timing, and juror
ratings of vote certainty. Juror perceptions and attitudes are also considered,
including jurors’ perceptions of trial evidence, trial complexity, skill of the
prosecution and defense attorneys, and whether all relevant evidence was
presented.
The next two sections evaluate differences in how jurors perceive the
evidence, followed by juror deliberation processes and group interactions.
Voting behaviors include whether the jury verdict favored acquittal or conviction, trial stages, vote timing, and the use of secret ballots. Variables such
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Figure 3: Percent of jurors who changed their minds during . . .
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as the views of the deliberation process and whether the law and legally
correct outcomes were fair are compared across groups. Juror characteristics, including gender, race, education, and age, are also explored as potential explanatory factors. Tables 1 and 2 provide summary statistics for most
of these explanatory variables. As described below, Tables 3, 4, and 5
display the responses of each of the three comparison groups (the majority,
the conforming dissenters, and the holdouts) on important explanatory
variables.
The willingness to hold out was linked to whether the one-person jury
verdict favored conviction or acquittal, and shows a clearly asymmetrical
pattern. Of the 167 jurors who said their one-person jury verdict was an
acquittal but the jury’s majority favored a conviction, 59 jurors, or 35
percent, ultimately hung the jury. In contrast, of the 184 jurors who said
their one-person jury verdict was a conviction but the jury’s majority favored
an acquittal, just 23, or 12.5 percent, hung the jury.
Aside from conviction versus acquittal verdict preferences, several
other differences emerged across these three groups of jurors. Reports of the
stages of the trial during which they changed their minds differed somewhat,
as shown in Figure 3. Holdout dissenters were especially likely to change
their opinions during jury deliberation and during the presentation of evidence by both sides. Holdouts changed their mind at different trial stages
than conforming dissenters. Over 40 percent of the conforming dissenters as
compared to approximately 25 percent of all other jurors changed their
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mind during deliberations. Undoubtedly, jury deliberation is a fertile site for
opinion change.
Once jurors enter the jury deliberation room, their chosen voting
protocol distinguishes the three groups of jurors. Comparing holdouts, conforming dissenters, and majority jurors, a univariate analysis reveals that both
dissenter groups were more likely to be on juries that voted earlier in the
deliberation process (F (2, 3305) = 8.85, p < 0.05). The vote-timing scale
ranged from 1, which represented a vote taken right at the beginning of
deliberations, to 6, which represented a vote taken only at the very end of
deliberations. Dissenter jurors, both holdouts (mean = 2.5) and conforming
dissenters (mean = 2.8), were more likely to report that their juries took an
earlier vote, compared to the vote timing reported by majority jurors
(mean = 3.1). A similar effect is evident for the jury’s use of secret ballots.
Majority jurors were least likely to report that their juries used a secret ballot
(37 percent), compared to conforming dissenters (47 percent) and holdouts
(53 percent) (c 2 (2) = 12.30, p < 0.05). The timing of the jury’s first vote was
significantly related to whether the vote was secret and by juror’s perceptions
of trial complexity (1 = not very complex; 7 = very complex, beta = 0.033,
p = 0.023; secret vote (1 = yes, 0 = no), beta = -0.273, p = 0.000). In effect,
juries who vote by secret ballots also tend to vote earlier in deliberations.
Jurors in more complex cases vote later. As we show below, employing these
variables in a regression model provides confirmatory evidence that the
effects of voting practices on dissent are robust, even when controlling for
the influence of other explanatory variables.
Another distinguishing characteristic among majority jurors and dissenters is their professed level of certainty in their votes. Conforming dissenters were least certain of their votes (F (2, 3181) = 8.60, p < 0.05, majority
M = 5.7, conforming dissenter M = 5.3, holdout M = 5.6). Individuals whose
verdict preference aligned with the majority were most certain on their first
vote (69 percent) compared to those in the dissenting groups (56 percent).
Comparing verdict preference shifts from first to final vote similarly reflects
this indecisiveness. Only 17 percent of the conforming dissenters remained
steady between their first and final votes. In contrast, 45 percent of those in
the majority and 43 percent of holdouts remained steady throughout the
votes, demonstrating that conforming dissenters have difficulty deciding on
a verdict (c 2 (2) = 14.80, p < 0.05).
Table 2 shows the relationship between demographic factors and conformity or dissent. Although in this sample there are no statistically significant differences as a function of race, education, and gender, we present
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Demographic Characteristics (%)
Dissent

Characteristic

All

Majority

Conform

Holdout

Age
18–25
26–35
36–45
46–55
56 and over

9.6
25.4
24.9
23.1
17.1

9.3
25.2
24.9
23.1
17.5

11.8
26.0
25.2
21.0
16.0

10.0
31.3
23.8
30.0
5.1

Gender
% Male

43.0

43.3

40.2

42.7

Race/Ethnicity
Black/African American
White/Caucasian
Hispanic
Other

26.4
44.0
21.7
7.7

26.0
44.3
21.7
8.0

27.7
44.3
22.5
5.6

35.8
33.3
23.4
7.4

Highest Education Level
Less than four years of high school
High school graduate
Some college
College graduate/postgraduate

3.3
16.3
30.7
49.7

3.3
16.5
31.1
49.0

3.8
15.1
26.4
54.7

0.0
13.4
29.3
57.3

Number of jurors

3,497

3,146

269

82

these variables because it is common belief that demographic characteristics
are associated with dissent. The age distribution was not significantly associated with dissention (c 2 (10) = 13.67, p = 0.188).
2. Differences in Perceptions of Evidence
Dissenting jurors also differ from the majority on their perceptions of the
evidence (see Table 3). Dissenting jurors were skeptical that all the relevant
evidence was presented in the case. According to dissenting jurors, the
prosecution was less skillful and the prosecution’s case was judged to be
weaker. Dissenters also reported less satisfaction with the manner in which
the trial was conducted. Holdouts, but not conforming dissenters, thought
the police were less believable. By and large, it appears that the dissenting
jurors were more skeptical of the strength of the prosecution’s case and
whether all the evidence was presented. Interestingly, the only dimension of
evidence for which there were no statistical differences among the groups
pertained to the expert testimony. Jurors in all groups reported it was
relatively easy to understand the expert’s testimony.
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Evidence Issues

Question Asked of Jurors
All relevant evidence presented?

Easy to understand evidence?

Easy to understand experts?

How believable were the police?

How skillful the prosecutor?

How satisfied with the manner the
trial was conducted?
How strong was prosecution’s case?

Mean*
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts

a

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

3.92
3.44b
2.65c
4.82a
4.44b
4.06b
5.20a
5.02a
6.12a
4.93a
4.92a
3.53b
4.73a
4.23b
3.65b
5.20a
4.41b
4.65b
4.48a
4.03b
2.94b

F

p-Value

5.61

0.004

3.00

0.050

2.15

0.117

5.33

0.005

5.35

0.005

7.95

0.000

7.15

0.001

Notes: *All responses were along a 7-point Likert scale (i.e., 7 = strongly agree, very easy, very
believable, very skillful, very satisfied, very strong). a,b,cMeans with different superscripts differ
significantly at p < 0.05 by the Tukey honestly significant difference test.

3. Differences in Deliberations
When jurors were asked about the deliberation process and juror interactions, juries with dissenters, as expected, indicated there was more conflict
and more time spent convincing one another to arrive at a verdict (see
Table 4). The mean ratings suggest that the deliberations were not overly
contentious (M = 3.5 on a seven-point scale, where 7 = a great deal of conflict). However, juries with a dissenter were more likely to report that one or
two people dominated discussions. Dissenting jurors reported that they participated more in deliberations, but felt they were less influential. Additionally, dissenters recalled that their jury was less open-minded and that each
juror’s viewpoint was not as thoroughly considered. Again, the ratings along
these dimensions were relatively high overall, indicating jurors generally saw
one another as open-minded, but this was less true for dissenting jurors.
Understandably, dissenting jurors were more surprised with others’ votes
and less satisfied with both the deliberations and the final decision.
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Deliberations Issues

Question Asked of Jurors
How surprised were you by other jurors’
votes?
How open-minded was the jury to each
other’s ideas?
How much did you participate in jury
deliberations?
How influential were you in the
deliberations?
How much did one or two jurors
dominate?
How thoroughly was each juror’s point
of view considered?
How much conflict on jury?

Were you given enough time to express
your views?
How much time and effort was spent
trying to convince to agree?
How satisfied were you with the
deliberations?
How satisfied were you with the
decision?
How easy for you personally to decide
on verdict?
Agree it is difficult to judge due to
religious beliefs?

Mean*
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming
Holdouts

a

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

Dissenters

3.23
3.84b
4.36b
5.69a
5.02b
4.40c
5.73a
5.86a
6.03a
4.55a
4.48a
3.96b
3.72a
4.36b
4.30b
6.00a
5.58b
5.20c
2.98a
3.42b
4.39c
6.43a
6.10b
6.32ab
4.63a
5.14b
6.26c
6.00a
5.19b
4.84c
6.05a
4.93b
4.16c
4.60a
3.50b
4.09c
2.14a
2.22a
1.64b

F

p-Value

20.33

0.000

38.91

0.000

1.79

0.168

6.10

0.002

13.90

0.000

21.51

0.000

21.98

0.000

7.33

0.001

31.37

0.000

44.28

0.000

76.07

0.000

39.18

0.000

3.52

0.030

Notes: *All responses were along a 7-point Likert scale (i.e., 7 = very surprised, very openminded, a great deal, very influential, very thoroughly, very satisfied, very easy, very difficult).
a,b,c
Means with different superscripts differ significantly at p < 0.05 by the Tukey honestly
significant difference test.
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Fairness of the Law and General Attitudes
Mean*

F

p-Value

Majority
Conforming Dissenters
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming Dissenters
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming Dissenters
Holdouts

5.78a
5.08b
4.74b
5.48a
4.59b
4.06c
4.31a
4.05b
4.39a

39.14

0.000

59.66

0.000

5.82

0.003

Majority
Conforming Dissenters
Holdouts
Majority
Conforming Dissenters
Holdouts

5.14a
4.72b
4.73b
5.47a
5.16b
5.24ab

11.65

0.000

7.73

0.000

Question Asked of Jurors
Fairness Issues
How fair was the law in this case?

How fair was the legally correct outcome?

How harsh were consequence of
conviction?
General Attitudes
How much do you trust police in your
community?
How much do you trust the courts in your
community?

Notes: *All responses were along a 7-point Likert scale (i.e., 7 = very fair, a great deal, too
harsh). a,b,cMeans with different superscripts differ significantly at p < 0.05 by the Tukey honestly
significant difference test.

When dissenting jurors conformed to the majority, they were more
likely to state that there was less time to express their views. In line with their
greater uncertainty, as reported above, jurors who were passive in their
dissent were more likely to say that it was hard for them to personally decide
on a verdict as compared to the other groups. Responses to these two
questions distinguished the two types of dissenting jurors, holdouts and
conforming dissenters. The latter were more frustrated in making the decision personally and in expressing their verdict preference.
Dissenting jurors judged the law and the legally correct outcome as less
fair than the majority jurors (see Table 5). However, the actual scores suggest
that, overall, jurors felt the law was relatively fair (mean = approximately 5 on
a seven-point scale, in which 7 = very fair).
D. Multivariate Analyses
Several multivariate statistical models assessed differences among majority
and dissenting jurors. The models accommodated for the fact that jurors on
the same jury are not independent by using a nested design that set each jury
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as a principal sampling unit.23 The first set of models differentiates majority
jurors from dissenting jurors. The second model predicts conforming dissenters from holdout jurors. A third set of models predicts dissenters from
holdout jurors, but explores the orientation of the dissenter (acquittal or
conviction prone). Previous analyses on these data have revealed significant
variations between the four jurisdictions.24 Thus, when possible, the models
also provide for a subsequent breakdown by site.
The first model, shown in Table 6, predicts dissenters (both holdouts
and conforming dissenters) from those whose one-person verdicts align with
the majority. Note that both jurors arguing for conviction and jurors arguing
for acquittal are included in the dissenters group in this model, and also
that acquittal-prone dissenters are more common than conviction-prone
dissenters. Thus this first model reflects multifaceted views of jurors. Predictor variables included the site, voting behaviors and procedures, evidentiary
issues, juror demographic characteristics, and juror attitudes.
The model results confirm the univariate analyses that procedural
factors are important. Dissenters were more likely to be on juries that voted
earlier in the deliberation process and had secret ballots. Perceptions of the
difficulty of the evidence were also useful in predicting group membership.
Dissenters were more likely than majority jurors to agree that the evidence
was difficult to understand. Juror views of fairness were also key to predicting
dissent. Dissenting jurors believed that the consequences of a conviction, the
applicable law, and the legally correct outcome were only moderately fair to
the defendant (averages were approximately 4 on a seven-point scale),
whereas majority jurors saw these dimensions as significantly more fair.
23

Complementary log-log models provide an alternative to logistic and probit analysis for binary
response variables. A complementary log-log function is asymmetrical and appropriate when the
probability of an event, in this case dissention, is small. In addition to the complementary log-log
models presented in Tables 6 through 8, a two-stage probit model was explored. The rationale
behind performing a two-stage probit analysis is to determine whether a selection effect is
present. It makes sense to consider a two-stage model, since the existence of holdout jurors at
the second stage is dependent on the existence of dissenting jurors at the first stage. The results
of the two-stage model analysis demonstrate that there was no selection effect (rho = 0), as
determined by a Wald test of independent equations (Wald c 2 (1) = 0.13, Prob. c 2 = 0.7229). As
a result of this finding, separate complementary log-log models, with controls for the nesting of
jurors within juries, are presented in this article.
24

The conviction rates ranged from a high of 63 percent in Maricopa County to a low of 33
percent in Bronx County and DC. The hung jury rate (hanging on any charge presented to the
jury) ranged from a high of 23 percent in DC to a low of 7 percent in Maricopa County.
Hannaford et al., supra note 3.

0.06
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.04

-0.14*
-0.22*
-0.10*
-0.09
-0.03
0.52

0.05
0.07

-0.12*
-0.22

1.73

0.18
0.16
0.13

0.27
0.22
0.16

0.12
0.10
0.07
0.10
0.10
1.27

-0.05
-0.22*
-0.16*
-0.04
-0.01
-0.40

0.11
0.16

0.47
0.33
0.24

0.15
0.27
0.07
0.01
-0.42*

0.39
0.12
0.05
0.10

SE

1.08*
-0.05
0.07
0.07

Coeff.

LA
(N = 703)

2.03

-0.05
-0.14*
-0.11*
-0.12
-0.09

0.73

0.09
0.07
0.06
0.07
0.08

0.06
0.10

0.27
0.46
0.24

-0.09
-0.32
0.19
-0.15*
-0.16

0.23
0.08
0.04
0.05

SE

0.00
-0.08
-0.06
0.00

Coeff.

DC
(N = 696)

0.70

-0.37*
-0.01
-0.08
0.01
-0.22*

-0.06
-0.04

0.10
0.23
0.26

0.79*
-0.20
0.17*
-0.08

Coeff.

1.20

0.14
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.09

0.11
0.14

0.42
0.41
0.27

0.39
0.11
0.02
0.08

SE

Bronx
(N = 407)

3.47

-0.10
-0.51*
0.06
-0.12
0.21*

-0.25*
-0.41

0.81
0.17
-0.14

0.22
-0.08
-0.04
-0.16*

Coeff.

1.36

0.19
0.10
0.15
0.13
0.09

0.11
0.22

0.50
0.34
0.36

0.34
0.15
0.10
0.08

SE

Maricopa
(N = 607)

Note: Table reflects results of a complementary log-log regression model that accounts for the nonindependence of jurors who sat on the same
case. *Indicates the coefficient is significant at p < 0.05.

Constant

0.16
0.05
0.03
0.04

SE

0.34*
-0.12*
0.01
-0.01

Coeff.

Combined
(N = 2413)

Regression Model Predicting Dissenters (= 1) from Majority (= 0)

Voting Behaviors
Secret ballot (1 = yes)
First vote (6 = end of delibs)
Begin leaning (8 = during delibs)
Certain on first vote (7 = very certain)
Demographics
Black
Hispanic
College degree (yes = 1)
Evidence
Understand evidence (7 = very easy)
Evidence favors one side (4 = strongly)
Attitudes
Conseq. of conviction (7 = too harsh)
Legally correct outcome (7 = very fair)
How fair was law (7 = very fair)
Trust police in community (7 = great deal)
Judge for religion reason (7 = very difficult)
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532
Waters and Hans

Opinion Formation, Conformity, and Dissent on Juries

533

Table 7: Regression Model Predicting Holdouts
(= 1) from Conforming Dissenters (= 0), N = 230

Deliberations/Voting Behaviors
Secret ballot (1 = yes)
Certain on first vote (7 = very certain)
Time to express views (7 = enough time)
Easy to decide personally (7 = very easy)
Influential during delibs (7 = very)
Judge for religious reason (7 = difficult)
Demographics
Black
Hispanic
College degree (yes = 1)
Evidence
Understand evidence (7 = very easy)
Understand expert evidence (7 = very easy)
Police testimony (7 = very believable)
Evidence favors one side (4 = strongly)
Attitudes
Legally correct outcome (7 = very fair)
Consequences of conviction (7 = too harsh)
Constant

Coeff.

SE

0.72
0.29*
0.07
-0.46*
-0.4*
-0.2

0.37
0.13
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.12

0.46
0.44
-0.26

0.34
0.37
0.29

0.01
0.27*
-0.31*
0.01

0.09
0.10
0.10
0.12

-0.13
0.09

0.08
0.11

-0.34

1.39

Note: Table reflects results of a complementary log-log regression model that accounts for the nonindependence of jurors
who sat on the same case. *Indicates the coefficient is significant at p < 0.05.

Neither the jurors’ racial and ethnic background nor their level of education
predicted dissention.
The site-specific models, also shown in Table 6, illustrate that location
matters. The particular factors that predict dissent vary somewhat depending
on the jurisdiction. Procedurally, dissenting jurors in LA and Bronx counties
were more likely to be on juries with secret ballots, and in the Bronx, they
began forming an opinion about the defendant’s guilt later than those in the
majority. In Maricopa County, dissenting jurors were less certain during the
jury’s first vote. Dissenting jurors from DC and Maricopa County indicated
more difficulty understanding the evidence in comparison to the majority
jurors in these jurisdictions. In LA, dissenting jurors were more apt than
majority jurors to say that the evidence did not strongly favor one side.
Despite differences across sites, there were some common patterns.
Across all the models (i.e., locations), jurors’ demographic variables failed to
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differentiate dissenters from jurors who voted with the majority. Juror attitudes about fairness contributed to dissention in all four sites. All dissenters,
except those in the Bronx, were more apt than majority jurors to feel that the
legally correct outcome was unfair. In the Bronx, dissenters felt that the
consequences of conviction were too lenient. This might be expected in a
site with a high acquittal rate such as the Bronx, as dissenting jurors who
favored conviction there were more common than those who favored acquittal, as was true for the other sites. Overall, juror attitudes about fairness
appear to drive their propensity to dissent. However, because these models
combine pro-acquittal and pro-conviction dissenters, and dissenters who
conform and those who hang the jury, they do not tell the full story.
What are the differences between dissenters who conform to the majority and those who choose to hold out and hang the jury? Results from the
second set of multivariate models predict holdouts from conformers.
Although previous analyses demonstrate that location matters, because of
the small sample size of holdout jurors, this model does not incorporate a
breakdown by site (see Table 7). Once again, but perhaps surprisingly,
demographic characteristics do not predict which dissenters acquiesce to the
majority and which hold out. Instead, holdout dissenters rated police testimony as less believable. Holdouts indicated more certainty on the jury’s first
vote, but even though these jurors hung the jury, they felt they were less
influential during jury deliberations.
Since a dissenter can argue either for a conviction or an acquittal, we
expected that these two groups are distinctively motivated. Therefore, in a
third set of multivariate models, dissenters were split into subgroups—
dissenters who were conviction prone and those who were acquittal prone.
Confirming the asymmetric bias noted earlier, dissenting conformists more
often argued for guilt, while the more numerous holdouts favored acquittal.
Sixty percent of conforming dissenters voted to convict, while 72 percent of
holdouts voted to acquit. Table 8 shows the multivariate models for the
acquittal-prone dissenters and the conviction-prone dissenters. As with the
model in Table 7, the small size of the groups precludes a site comparison.
First, the model for the acquittal-prone dissenters fits the data very well.
In fact, this model correctly classified jurors 86 percent of the time. This
percent reflects an improvement of 39 percent over a naïve control model
(predicting jurors will always conform). Acquittal-prone dissenters who held
out to hang their juries were more certain about their first vote and were
more likely to be in a jury that polled jurors through a secret ballot. Holdouts
indicated there was more time to express their views than conforming dis-
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Table 8: Regression Model Predicting Holdouts (= 1) from Conforming
Dissenters (= 0)
Acquittal-Prone
Dissenters (N = 121)

Deliberations/Voting Behaviors
Secret ballot (1 = yes)
Certain on first vote (7 = very certain)
Time to express views (7 = enough time)
Easy to decide personally (7 = very easy)
Influential during delibs (7 = very)
Judge for religious reason (7 = difficult)
Demographics
Black
Hispanic
College degree (yes = 1)
Evidence
Understand evidence (7 = very easy)
Understand expert evidence (7 = very easy)
Police testimony (7 = very believable)
Evidence favors one side (4 = strongly)
Attitudes
Legally correct outcome (7 = very fair)
Consequences of conviction (7 = too harsh)
Constant

Conviction-Prone
Dissenters (N = 113)

Coeff.

SE

Coeff.

SE

1.52*
0.49*
0.27*
-0.85*
-0.43*
-0.36*

0.47
0.18
0.14
0.18
0.12
0.14

0.53
0.43
0.42
-0.23*
-0.71
-0.46

0.71
0.32
0.29
0.10
0.36
0.53

0.09
0.86*
-0.19

0.44
0.35
0.37

0.57
0.25
-0.10

0.66
0.65
0.81

-0.16
0.56*
-0.20
-0.05

0.15
0.16
0.14
0.16

0.19
0.40*
-0.11
0.33

0.13
0.14
0.17
0.26

-0.61*
-0.63*

0.17
0.22

0.19
0.46

0.13
0.14

3.10

2.08

-9.11

3.72

Note: Table reflects results of a complementary log-log regression model that accounts for the
nonindependence of jurors who sat on the same case. *Indicates the coefficient is significant at
p < 0.05.

senters, yet also believed they were less influential. The model also reveals
that perceived fairness matters. Holdouts for an acquittal rated the legally
correct outcome as less fair (M = 4.0) than the conforming dissenters who
favored acquittal (M = 4.8).
Although the differences are small according to a bivariate comparison,
the multivariate model identifies that Hispanics are more likely than Caucasians to be among the holdouts to acquit. This emphasizes the importance of
incorporating multiple factors in prediction models. Although site controls
were not included in the model due to the number of observations at this level,
an inspection of the site distribution of the Hispanic dissenters did not show
a site clustering; rather, the Hispanic dissenters were spread across the sites.
Finally, acquittal-prone holdouts believed they understood the expert evidence better than the conforming dissenters who favored acquittal.
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As for the conviction-prone dissenters who held out or conformed, they
too differed on expert evidence perceptions, such that conviction-prone
holdouts thought they understood the expert evidence better than their
conforming colleagues. There were no race or ethnicity effects for
conviction-prone dissenters. The only other significant predictor was that
holdouts for conviction found it personally more difficult to reach a decision
than those who conformed to acquit the defendant. Those who conformed
felt they were marginally (p = 0.055) more influential than the holdout
jurors. It is possible that conforming dissenters were, in fact, able to effect
changes in the jury’s eventual verdict, or that there simply was more successful normative and informative influence operating in the acquitting juries
than in juries where a convicting minority hung the jury.

IV. Discussion
The data collected as part of the NIJ-funded NCSC hung jury study continue
to show value in addressing a wide range of research issues, including questions analyzed in this article about the formation of jurors’ individual opinions in felony trials and the relationship between these individual views and
group verdicts. Overall, the results confirm some prior research and identify
new issues worthy of further exploration.
Regarding the process of opinion formation, jurors rarely report
leaning toward one side or another early in the case; instead, they more
often begin to favor one side or another during the state’s evidence presentation, the defense evidence presentation, and even in the jury deliberation. Jurors report often changing their minds during the trial. This
presents a more fluid and flexible picture of juror decision making than
that suggested by the pundits who say the trial’s all over after the opening
statements.
It is useful to contrast the Hannaford et al. civil jury study of opinion
formation and change with the current project. There are some remarkable similarities; low numbers of both civil and criminal jurors say they
began leaning toward one side during opening statements. Closing arguments and judicial instructions are also case segments identified by a relatively small proportion of both criminal and civil jurors. About one in five
civil and criminal jurors say they began leaning toward one side during
jury deliberations. The evidentiary portions of the trial dominate all other
segments in both types of trials, but the prosecution’s evidence in
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criminal trials is apparently more influential. For example, 24 percent of
civil jurors say they began leaning toward one side during the plaintiff’s
evidence, compared to over 37 percent of criminal jurors who say they
began leaning during the prosecution’s evidence. The defense evidence is
slightly more important in civil trials (19 percent) than in criminal trials
(15 percent).
Analyses of the relationship between individual juror preferences and
final jury decisions reinforce their strong connection, found in earlier
analyses of this data set, other studies of jurors, and mock jury experiments.25 However, one unique contribution of our analysis is to complicate
the notion of the juror’s individual preference and, indeed, of jury unanimity. We measured jurors’ verdict preferences in several different ways,
asking which side they favored, their initial and final votes, and their oneperson jury verdicts. Although all of these are strongly related, they are not
identical. What is more, the analyses reveal that a sizable proportion of
jurors eventually voted in line with the group but at odds with their personal preferences. A substantial minority of jurors, if given the chance to
decide the verdict alone, say they would have voted against their jury’s
decision.
Despite the complications in interpreting the question, it is worth
considering why a sizeable proportion of jurors report a one-person jury
verdict that differs from the jury’s decision. In addition to group factors that
influence conformity, jurors’ views of the evidence, jurors’ sense of fairness,
and deliberation procedures were all found to be related to the likelihood
they would dissent. We also propose that juror role expectations affected
dissenting jurors’ willingness to go along with the majority.
Classic studies in social psychology on social pressure to conform have
found that individuals regularly conform to the majority views of a group,
particularly if they are alone and without other supporters, and we see that
operating in the jury context.26 Minority faction size is critical to predicting
the final outcome. In this study, the chances of a jury reaching a verdict
decreased with an increase in the minority faction size. Larger factions
25
Prior analyses documenting the effect in this data set include Eisenberg et al., supra note 5,
Hannaford et al., supra note 3, and Hans et al., supra note 11. Other supportive research may
be found in Devine et al., supra note 9, and Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 9.
26
Classic citations of conformity effects in groups include Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity. A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 Psychol. Monographs (Whole No. 416) (1956); Roger Brown, Social Psychology 656–708 (1965).
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produced the strength and support needed to sustain deliberations and were
more apt to hang the jury.27
Aspects of the trial evidence may hold the key to juror conformity and
dissent. If the evidence does not strongly support one side, others may more
easily persuade a juror to compromise. Recall that dissenting jurors who
conformed were more uncertain about the evidence and found it more
difficult to come to a firm decision about the merits of the case. Whether the
bulk of the evidence favors the prosecution or the defense also seems important. An asymmetric bias was not found in comparisons of first to final votes
of juries, but it did emerge as we examined dissenting jurors who conformed
to the majority or who hung the jury. The significance of legal fairness
variables among dissenters converges with their links to verdict choices more
generally.28
Some scholars have discussed the role of race and gender in jury deliberations and dissent.29 With one exception, in which Hispanics were more likely
than Caucasians to be holdouts to acquit, demographic factors such as race,
ethnicity, gender, and age did not significantly predict dissent in this sample.
Because the comparison of acquittal-prone jurors included relatively small
numbers of jurors from four jurisdictions with diverse populations, it would be
useful in future studies to examine the relationship between demographic
characteristics and dissent in a broader range of jurisdictions.
In terms of other factors that might persuade an individual to acquiesce to the majority verdict preference, we suggest that jurors’ role expectations are important. First, the dissenting juror may be adhering to the formal
letter of the law, even though that is at odds with his or her common sense
of justice. Judicial instructions provide jurors with a legal framework to apply
the evidence they heard. Jurors may believe the legally correct outcome to be
unfair, but choose to follow the instructions and thus acquiesce to the legally
correct majority preference, even though they, personally, wish for the opposite result. Jurors are not voting in line with their personal preferences (or
conscience) but they are following their interpretation of the law. Our

27

Devine et al., supra note 8.

28
Eisenberg et al., supra note 5; Garvey et al., supra note 4; Hannaford & Hans, supra note 6;
Hannaford et al., supra note 3.
29

See, e.g., Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1261
(2000).
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results indicate that jurors who dissented and hung the jury believed the
legally correct outcome was less fair than those in the majority.
A central part of the juror’s role is arriving at a verdict unanimously or
nearly unanimously. The expectation placed on all jurors from the very
beginning of their jury service is that they will listen to the evidence presented at trial, apply the law as described in the jury instructions, and, after
discussing the evidence and law, arrive at a group consensus about the
verdict. These role expectations combine with typical conformity pressures
in groups to encourage jurors to accede to the majority view even if they are
not privately as fully persuaded as others. The desire to fulfill one’s job as a
juror may outweigh one’s individual verdict preferences in some cases.
In addition to evidentiary and role concerns, a third explanation suggests that structural aspects of deliberations influenced the extent to which
jurors’ verdict preferences were reflected in the jury’s final verdict. Dissenting jurors were more likely to be on juries that voted early in the deliberation
process and used secret ballots. Vote timing and use of secret ballots tend to
co-occur, and are more likely to be present in contentious or complex cases
from an evidentiary, group, or political perspective. However, they could also
be important causal variables in their own right. For instance, the timing of
the vote and the public versus private expression of individual views might
well encourage or discourage jurors to voice their opinions. Effective leadership might facilitate the full exchange of views, which would lead to
genuine opinion influence. Our results reveal that dissenting jurors were
more apt than majority jurors to say that one or two jurors dominated
deliberations and, as expected, there was more conflict on the jury.
What all this suggests is that, contrary to Kalven and Zeisel’s sense that
jury deliberations are unimportant, deliberations play a vital role in generating juror consensus, the consensus that comes from opinion change as well
as from conformity to the majority view. These data also shed new light on
the current debate over the requirement that juries be unanimous in their
verdict.30 What seems clear is that unanimous jury decisions include not only
those cases in which there is genuine agreement, but also a significant
number of cases in which jurors “agree to disagree” and acquiesce. Jury
decisions are not unique in this regard. Empirical studies of appellate
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American Bar Association, Principles for Juries & Jury Trials (2005); Shari S. Diamond, Mary
R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the NonUnanimous Civil Jury, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 201 (2006); Valerie P. Hans, The Power of Twelve: The
Impact of Jury Size and Unanimity on Civil Jury Decision Making, 4 Del. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
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decision making confirm many anecdotal reports that judges behave strategically to maximize their policy objectives, and that includes voting in line
with the majority despite holding contrary private views.31 Accommodations
that occur among members of a panel or court include reducing the ideological tone of majority opinions, modifying sections of opinions, and rendering mixed decisions in which benefits are provided to both parties. A
norm of judicial consensus promotes the legitimacy of the court, just as
apparent jury unanimity enhances the legitimacy of the jury and its verdict.

31
See, for example, Joshua B. Fischman, Decision-Making Under a Norm of Consensus:
A Structural Analysis of Three-Judge Panels (2008), unpublished manuscript available at
(SSRN.com); Stefanie A. Lindquist, Wendy L. Martinek & Virginia A. Hettinger, Splitting the
Difference: Modeling Appellate Court Decisions with Mixed Outcomes, 41 Law & Soc. Rev. 429,
434–35 (2007).

